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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff Vietta Steel sued the defendant, Robert 
Breinholt, dba Aspen Care Center, for damages arising from 
her arrest for trespass at the Aspen Care Center on October 
22, 1984 after the criminal charge was dismissed against her 
in November, 1984 because there was insufficient evidence 
for a prosecution. Her civil complaint alleged causes of 
acts for malicious prosecution; abuse of process; false 
imprisionment; and a tort of outrage as set out in the 
Restatement (2nd) of Torts, §46. 
The trial court instructed the jury that if plain-
tiff had committed a criminal trespass she could not recover 
against the defendant under theories of malicious prosecu-
tion, abuse of process or false imprisionment regardless of 
defendant's motive in having her arrested. The trial judge 
refused, however, to instruct the jury that under Section 
76-6-206(4) plaintiff was not guilty of trespass if: 
(a) that the property was open to the pub-
lic when the actor entered or remained and 
(b) the actor's conduct did not substan-
tially interfer with the owners use of the 
property. 
The failure to so instruct was prejudicial error. 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff Vietta Steele appeals to this court for 
an order granting her a new trial due to the trial courts 
failure to properly instruct the jury on the legal defense 
to the charge of criminal trespass. 
Disposition of Case in Lower Court 
Trial was held on May 27, through 30, 1986 before 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist sitting with a jury. The 
jury found no cause of action by plaintiff against defendant 
and awarded no damages in the case. Plaintiff's Complaint 
was accordingly dismissed. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff Vietta Steele was an old friend of a man 
named Zenon Domper. They met in 1968 when both worked at 
the Defense Depot, Ogden. A friendship developed and Mr. 
Domper was thereafter a frequent quest in the Steele house-
hold. (TR.5f R.612) Later when confined in a nursing 
home, the Steeles were frequent and regular visitors with 
Mr. Dompor through June, 1984. 
In June 1970, Mr. Domper suffered a stroke. At his 
request and through his personal attorney Pete Vlahos, Mrs. 
Steele was appointed his legal guardian. (TR.6, R.613) She 
served in that capacity for about five (5) years and her 
husband did so for another year. Thereafter Mr. Domperfs 
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financial affairs were turned over to the First Security 
BanK where they remained until his death. (TR.9, R.616) 
In late 1983, Mrs. Steele learned of money being 
given by Mr. Domper to employees of the Aspen Care Center in 
excess of normal nursing home expenses. She felt that gifts 
of $300.00 to $500.00 to nursing home employees were inap-
propriate due to the possibility of coercion or undue influ-
ence on Mr. Domper by Aspen Care Center employees. She made 
complaint to the Veteran's Administration and the State of 
Utah. (TR.11-14, R.618-621) 
Aspen Care Center was notified of these complaints 
around the month of January or early February, 1984 (TR.314, 
R.921). In March, 1984 Mr. Domper allegedly wanted to see 
an attorney about terminating a Power of Attorney he 
believed Mrs. Steele possessed concerning his financial 
affairs. Attorney Burt Havas was contacted by the Care 
Center (TR.289, R.896). Mr. Havas had previously worked for 
the Care Center but did not know Mr. Domper (TR.277, R.884). 
There had been no effort made by Care Center employees to 
contact Mr. Domper's personal attorney of many years 
standing, attorney Pete Vlahos. As a result of Mr. Havas1 
meeting with Mr. Domper, a letter was sent by Mr. Havas to 
Mrs. Steele terminating the Power of Attorney which in fact 
never existed (TR.277, R.884). 
On June 21, 1984, Mrs. Steele received another 
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letter from Attorney Havas demanding that she not see Mr. 
Domper or attempt to do so in the future or a restraining 
order would be obtained. Mr. Domper did not authorize or 
request that this letter be sent (TR.295, R.902). Rather, 
it was generated at the request of the Care Center. At the 
same time instructions were given Aspen Care Center that 
Mrs. Steele was not to visit Mr. Domper for more than 30 
minutes at a time. These latter instructions again came 
from Mr. Havas. 
Mrs. Steele stayed away from the Care Center until 
late 1984 although she remained in contact with Care Center 
employees, specifically Steven Anderson, receiving reports 
about Mr. Domper's health. (TR.275, R.882) 
In late September, 1984 Mrs. Steele visited Mr. 
Domper in the company of Robert Lowe a Veteran's 
Administration specialist employed by the State of Utah, 
Department of Employment Security (TR.132, R.739). Mr. 
Domper appeared glad to see them and appreciative of their 
visit (TR.135, R.742). Around October 21, 1984 Mrs. Steele 
learned that Mr. Domper's health was deteriorating so she 
went to visit Mr. Domper in the company of her friend, Anna 
Holman who was also acquainted with Mr. Domper. She found 
Mr. Domper in poor physical health and dressed in a dirty 
soiled shirt. She and Mrs. Holman changed the shirt while 
visiting with Mr. Domper. Again Mr. Domper seemed apprecia-
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tive of the visit (TR.151-52, R.758-759). 
Alarmed at Mr. Domper's condition, early the next 
morning (a Monday) Mrs. Steele called the Veteran's 
Administration Hospital in Salt Lake City. She was referred 
again to Robert Lowe who she spoke to by telephone. She 
informed Mr. Lowe that she was very alarmed about Mr. 
Domper's condition (TR.138, R.745). Mr. Lowe contacted the 
Veteran's Administration in Salt Lake City and was 
instructed to tell Mrs. Steele to go see Mr. Domper and 
inquire whether he wanted to go to the hospital. If he did, 
Mrs. Steele could then bring Mr. Domper to the hospital 
immediately. (TR.139, R.746). Mr. Lowe relayed these 
instructions to Mrs. Steele. (TR.139-40, R.746-747). 
After receiving these instruction from Mr. Lowe, 
Mrs. Steele and her husband went to the Aspen Care Center. 
Mrs. Steele had a pocket tape recorder in her purse. She 
turned it on as she got out of her car to enter the Care 
Center. The tape recording (R.218) is an important piece of 
evidence because it contains no evidence of any disturbance 
or unreasonable conduct on the part of Mrs. Steele from 
which it can be concluded that she in any way substantially 
interferred with the defendant's operation of its Care 
Center. 
When Mrs. Steele and her husband entered the Care 
Center, Mr. Domper was in a wheelchair in the lobby (TR.159, 
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R.766-767). Mr. Steele asked Mr. Domper if he wanted to go 
to the Veteran's Administration Hospital and he nodded yes 
(TR.160, R.767). 
While Mr. Steele was speaking to Mr. Domper, a 
woman arrived and asked Mrs. Steele if she was Vietta 
Steele. Receiving an affirmative answer the woman (Jolene 
Hill) told Mrs. Steele that she could not be in the facility 
because there was a restraining order in existance prohibit-
ing her presence in the Care Center. Mrs. Steele requested 
that she be shown the order. None could be produced because 
none existed. 
A second employee, Debra Hill, was called to the 
front office area. She wheeled Mr. Domper out of the lobby. 
When Debra Hill learned that Mrs. Steele was present she 
called Salt Lake City. She spoke to a Pamela Bues who was 
the bookkeeper for the Aspen Care Center. Pamela Bues 
instructed Debra Hill to have Mrs. Steele arrested for 
trespass. It was the intent of Pamela Bues that the arrest 
be used to get Mrs. Steele out of the facility. (TR.239, 
R.846). There was no intent at any time that Mrs. Steele be 
prosecuted for criminal trespass, rather that the arrest 
process simply be used as a vehicle to remove her from the 
facility on that particular day. 
The Ogden City Police were called with Officer Ann 
Grotegut responding. It was the testimony of the two Care 
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Center employees and Officer Grotegut that Mrs. Steele was 
asked to leave the premises voluntarily or she would be 
arrested. It was the testimony of Mrs. Steele and her hus-
band that she was never asked to voluntarily leave the faci-
lity before she was placed under arrest. 
Mrs. Steele was then placed under arrest by Officer 
Grotegut, transported the Weber County Jail and there booked 
into that facility. She was searched, her mug shot and fin-
gerprints obtained. She remained in jail for approximately 
an hour and a half before she was released on her own 
recognizance. She was directed to appear in Circuit Court 
in November, 1984. She hired attorney Don Sharp to defend 
her on the criminal charge. On the day set for trial the 
criminal trespass charge was dismissed because there was 
insufficient evidence to proceed. Actually the Car Center 
had been contacted and declined prosecution. 
Four days following Mrs. Steele's arrest at the 
Aspen Care Center on October 22, 1984 Mr. Domper's whose 
deteriorating health Mrs. Steele had been gravely concerned 
about, died at the Aspen Care Center. 
Following the testimony at trial and over plain-
tiff's objections, Judge Wahlquist instructed the jury that 
Mrs. Steele could not recover in the case under theories of 
malicious prosecution, abusive process or false imprision-
ment if she was at the time of her arrest guilty of criminal 
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trespass regardless of the defendant's intent or motive in 
having her arrested or using the criminal process only to 
obtain her removal from the Care Center Facility on October 
22, 1984. The trial court refused to instruct the jury that 
it is a defense to the charge of criminal trespass that the 
facility was open to the public when Mrs. Steele entered or 
remained in the building and her conduct did not substan-
tially interfer with the defendant's use and operation of 
the Care Center. 
The pertinent instruction given by the court is set 
out in the explanation on pages 194 and 195 of the record. 
It states: 
The plaintiff here alleges that the agents 
of the defendant lack both proper motive, 
that is, acting with malice, and acted also 
without probable cause, that is a reasona-
ble basis for the belief that she had com-
mitted criminal trespass. The defendant 
denies these allegations. The defendant 
further alleges that the plaintiff is in 
fact guilty of the charge. The law pro-
vides that persons should be encouraged to 
bring criminal offenders to justice, and 
does not intend to reward guilty people 
with civil judgment, and, therefore, guilty 
persons should not recover for any of the 
first three civil wrongs here alleged, such 
as malicious prosecution, abusive process, 
false arrest or imprisonment. If she is in 
fact guilty of criminal trespass, she can-
not recover under any of the first three 
theories or questions here presented, and 
the answer to each question should be "no". 
For this defense to come into play, the 
defendant must prove by at least a prepon-
derance of the evidence the elements of 
that offense. The elements are as follows: 
(1) That the plaintiff entered or remained 
on the defendants premises; and (2) did so 
after she was reasonably informed that she 
was requested not to enter, or remain. 
7 
Plaintiff's objections to that portion of the jury 
instructions are set out in the record at pages 928-939, 
(TR.321-332). 
Summary of Argument 
The trial court improperly refused to instruct the 
jury that it is a defense to the criminal charge of trespass 
that the property in question was open to the public when 
plaintiff entered or remained in the Care Center and plain-
tiff's conduct did not substantially interfere with the 
defendant's use of the property pursuant to Section 
76-6-206(4), UCA. This is a factual issue under the crimi-
nal trespass section of the Code and should have been sub-
mitted to the Jury. 
ARGUMENT 
There are no cases in Utah which discuss the 
perimeters of the meaning or application of the language 
contained in Section 76-6-206(4), A logical interpretation 
of that statutory language, however, is that the legislature 
recognized that circumstances may occur in which a person 
has a legitmate reason for remaining on property or refusing 
to leave when demanded to so do, and that the criminal tres-
pass statute cannot be used as a pretext in those circum-
stances to obtain the otherwise improper removal of another 
from the premises. 
The primary reason advanced by the trial court for 
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failing to instruct the jury concerning the statutory 
defense to criminal trespass set out in the statute was the 
trial judge's opinion that the statute must only refer to a 
public building, for example a court house, municipal, 
county or state office building rather than a privately 
owned facility otherwise open to the public (TR.328, 
R.935) . 
There was no question in this case that the Care 
Center was open to the public when plaintiff entered. The 
deposition of the defendant is pertinent: 
Q: The nursing home facilities, or specif-
ically Aspen Care, do they maintain visit-
ing hours or open visiting with people? 
A: It's open visitation. People can come 
visit the patients there most any time 
that's a reasonable hour. 
Q: Is the facility generally then open to 
the public for visitation purposes like 
that? 
A: Well, in the sense that visitors are 
welcome at any hour it is. It's not gener-
ally open to the public who have no purpose 
for being there. (Brienholt Depo. P. 29, 
R.594) 
Q: Now, the Aspen Care Center, do you 
consider it as open to the public? 
A: Well, it's private property. And it's 
open to people who have a purpose for being 
there for. . . . and it's also open to 
patient visitors whom the patient would 
want. (TR.306, R.913) 
Clearly a nursing home is a quasi-public facility 
in the sense that anyone who has a legitimate purpose in 
9 
visiting or confiring with a patient may enter at any hour. 
Mrs. Steele's sole purpose in going to the Care Center on 
October 22, 1984 was her legitimate concern about Mr. 
Domper's deteriorating health. Absent a restraining order 
preventing her from entering the factility, she was legally 
entitled to do so. Assuming she was asked to leave the pre-
mises before she was placed under arrest, which is disputed, 
was her refusal justified by her concern for Mr. Domper's 
health? She was a friend of many years standing, familiar 
with Mrs. Domper's physical condition and appearance; had 
received word that Mr. Domper's health was deteriorating; 
had verified that information through her own observation on 
the previous day; and had been so concerned that she felt it 
necessary to try and obtain immediate hospital care; and in 
fact he died four days later. Those facts would certainly 
seem to lend the air of legitimacy to her presence at the 
Care Center on October 22, 1984. 
From a social standpoint, the elderly who are phys-
ically or mentally infirm are routinely placed in nursing 
care facilities like Aspen Care Center. The elderly them-
selves may be too ill or too dependant or too scarred to 
themselves monitor the care or conduct of a nursing home 
facility to be assured that they are receiving proper care 
or treatment. Therefore, the obligation of scruitinizing 
that care and conduct must fall on friends and relatives of 
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the patient. In that circumstance if there is a legitimate 
belief that the medical treatment a patient is receiving is 
inadequate and the need for additional care immediate that 
concern should not be capable of defeat via the criminal 
trespass statute simply because a person is asked to leave a 
facility and if she or he refuses can be placed under arrest 
and removed. At that point a more searching inquiry into 
the facts, as via a hearing on request for a temporary 
restraining order would certainly seem preferable and more 
appropriate than resort to a pretext arrest under the tres-
pass statute. 
There is extremely little lav^  on this subject. 
Utah has no statute guaranteeing access to a patient in a 
nursing care facility. There have been some limited cases 
dealing with this subject matter. These are set out in 
Nursing Home Law contained in Chapter 5, Access to 
Facilities, attached hereto as Appendix 1 and referred to in 
the case of Rabbi Samuel Teitelbaum and Larry and Louise 
Diehl, plaintiffs, v. Theordore Sorensony dba Waitwell 
Nursing Home, Civil No. 79-199 in the United States 
District Court in and for the District of Arizona, the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order granting 
preliminary injunction, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Appendix 2. 
The remaining question involved is whether or not 
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Mrs. Steele's presence at the nursing care factility 
substantially interferred with the defendant's use and oper-
ation of that facility during her presence in the Aspen Care 
lobby. This would appear to be a purely factual question 
for determination by the jury and if it concluded that the 
purpose of her visit was legitimate and she was not behaving 
in an unreasonable manner would have permitted the jury to 
find that despite a request to leave the premises, if in 
fact such a request was made, a refusal to do so was proper 
under the circumstances, thereby permitting her to recover 
under her theories of malicious prosecution, abuse of proc-
ess or false arrest and imprisonment. Having received only 
an instruction that a criminal trespass occurred if Mrs. 
Steele was asked to leave and declined to do so, or simply 
remained on the premises the jury was erroneously instructed 
and the error was completely prejudicial to plaintiff's 
first three causes of action. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erroneously failed to instruct the 
jury on the statutory defense to criminal trespass and this 
error was prejudicial requiring an Order be entered granting 
plaintiff a new trial. * 
DATED this <Z?f nj day of September, 1986. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
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/James R. Has/enyager 
/ / Attorney for Plaintiff, 
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CHAPTERS NVitSiMG i-io-u^ 
ACCESS TO FACILITIES 
5.1 THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS 
Access to nursing homes by members of the public is an 
issue of renewed concern to residents' advocates. Effective 
advocacy is usually not possible unless advocates are 
physically able to enter nursing homes to visit and meet 
with residentSo 
In the early 1970s, several cases were brought by com-
munity groups seeking entry into nursing homes.' Prompt 
settlement of the early litigation, giving plaintiffs the ac-
cess theyvspught, led to little serious development of case 
law in this area. * 
Recently, attention has again been focused on the pro-
blem of access, as nursing homes have begun to close their 
doors to advocates. An advocate in Minneapolis, Min-
nesota, for example, was convicted of criminal trespass for 
visiting a disabled friend after being advised that her 
"privilege" to visit had been revoked by the facility.2 Other 
advocates have also been physically barred at the door and 
told not to enter. Still others face a new series of restric-
tions on the access they are "given." For example: 
• Residents may be visited only if a staff person is pre-
sent; 
• Only certain issues may be discussed; 
• No photographs may be taken; and 
• No reports may be issued unless they are first 
cleared with the facility's administration. 
Access to facilities by residents' invited guests is not 
usually a problem. A resident may generally see and visit 
with persons of his/her own choice. Exceptions may arise if 
the resident is under guardianship or conservatorship or in 
instances in which local law permits a particular visitor to 
be barred as "medically contraindicated." 
More difficult access issues arise: 
• When the resident, because of mental and/or 
physical infirmities, is unable to communicate 
his/her wishes to see particular visitors in a manner 
readily understood by others; and 
• When the resident is initially unaware of the ex-
istence of an outside advocate and contact between 
them is initiated by the advocate. 
1 Citizens for Better Care v. Alden Care Enterprises, 
Inc.. No. 72-214876, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 687 (Mar. 
1973) (Clearinghouse No. 9.505) (Cir. Ct. Mich., filed 
Aug. 11,1972); Health Law Project v. Sarah Allen Nur-
sing Home, No. 71-17195, (Clearinghouse No. 6,177) 
(E.D. Pa., filed July 20,1971) (stipulation entered Aug. 
13,1971). 
2 State v. Hoyt, No. 1021885 (Mun. Ct. Minn, First Div., 
July 5, 1979), aff'd. No. 73573 (Dist Ct Minn., Fourth 
Jud. Dist., Dec 11, 1979), rev'd on appeal, No. 50889 
(Minn., Apr. 14, 1981). The reversal of Hoyt's convic-
tion occurred nearly two years after the conviction. 
Hoyt was barred from the facility for the entire in-
tervening period. 
To secure full and free access to facilities in these situa-
tions, administrative advocacy and litigation should be us-
ed. In addition, legislation at both the federal and state 
levels is appropriate and necessary. 
5.2 ESTABLISHING RIGHTS OF ACCESS 
5.2.1 ADMINISTRATIVE ADVOCACY 
An administrative complaint* was filed with the Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR), Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS), seeking enforcement of the federal skilled nur-
sing facility regulations,4 of the regulations enforcing sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,5and of the 
California Long-Term Care Health, Safety and Security Act 
of 1973.' The administrative complaint alleged three major 
categories of violations: 
• Failure to provide adequate resident care; 
• Retaliation against and intimidation of residents 
and an advocacy group (United Neighbors in Action) 
that complained about residents' care; and 
• Illegal restrictions on access and on the rights of 
speech and association of residents and the ad-
vocacy group. 
Among other remedies, complainants ask HHS, the Health 
Care Financing Administration (HCFA), and OCR to issue 
written guidelines for skilled nursing facilities that 
clearly set forth patients' rights to voice and seek 
resolution of complaints of patient care violations and 
to associate with advocacy organizations, and the 
right of advocacy organizations to work toward im-
proving patient care and to have access to facilities in 
order to do so.? 
OCR's July 20,1981, report of its investigation states that 
Section 504's prohibition against intimidatory or retaliatory 
acts applies only to rights or privileges secured by the 
Rehabilitation Act and not, more generally, to questions 
about quality of care. Nevertheless, it requires the facility 
to amend its grievance procedure to guarantee access to 
advocates: 
3 United Neighbors in Action v. Sequoia Manor Con-
valescent Hospital, Inc., OCR Docket No. 09-80-3074 
(Dec. 27, 1979), 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 374 (July 1980) 
(Clearinghouse No. 29,300). 
4 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1101-.1137 (1980). 
5 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), 45 C.F.R Part 84 (1980). See § 
6.2.1.1 intra. 
6 22 CAL AOM. COOE §§ 70001-74525 (1972) (§§ 1417-39 of 
the CALIFORNIA HEALTH & SAFETY COOE) (1979). 
7 United Neighbors in Action v. Sequoia Manor Con-
valescent Hospital, Inc., OCR Docket No. 09-80-3074 
(Dec. 27, 1979), 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 374 (July 1980) 
(Clearinghouse No. 29,300). Administrative Com-
plaint, Relief V-C-9, at 40. 
ie grievance policy and procedure must include the 
ght of (Sequoia Manor Convalescent Hospital] SMCH 
•sidents to. have access to persons such as friends, 
Natives, lawyers, or representatives of advocacy 
roups, who may assist them in making complaints 
nder Section 504. Access to assistance must be 
nder circumstances which provide for confidentiality 
nd reasonable visiting times. Potential complainants 
esiring to utilize the grievance procedure may need 
uch assistance in order to be notified of their rights or 
;ommunicate their concerns because of their han-
licapping condition (e.g., aural or visual impairments, 
ipeech impediments). In these circumstances, the 
lenial of such assistance would constitute a denial of 
iue process.' 
5.2.2 LITIGATION BY ADVOCACY 
GROUPS 
The first amendment rights of members of a community 
Ivocacy group to visit nursing home residents on their 
vn initiative, without an invitation from the residents, 
sre affirmed in Teitelbaum v. Sorenson.9 Volunteers with 
e nursing home resident outreach project sponsored by 
e Arizona Center for Law in the Public" Interest attempted 
> visit a local nursing home to distribute a brochure on 
sidents' rights and to discuss with residents a state law 
ititling them to a state renter's tax credit or refund. They 
ere granted admission only for the purpose of discussing 
•sidents' rights. When the nursing home's administrator 
rohibited a return visit to discuss the tax law, several 
Dlunteers with the project filed suit against the facility. 
Asserting that communication between plaintiffs and 
ssidents is indisputably protected under the first amend-
lent, plaintiffs phrased the single issue before the court as 
/nether the conduct of the privately owned nursing home 
iras under color of law.10 
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
'reliminary Injunction, entered July 3,1979, the court found 
hat the residents of the facility are elderly and infirm and 
hat "their lives are characterized by dependency upon the 
lursing home staff and administration."11 The fact of in-
stitutionalization, the court concluded, discourages 
•esidents from voicing concerns and grievances, thus mak-
ing independent advocacy essential. 
8 Letter from Floyd L Pierce, Director, OCR, Region IX 
to Steven Ronfeldt, Legal Aid Society of Alameda 
County (July 20, 1981) (copy in National Senior 
Citizens Law Center (NSCLQ files). 
9 Civ. A. No. 79-199 PHX WEC (D. Ariz., filed Mar. 16, 
1979) (permanent injunction issued Aug. 6, 1979). 
Plaintiffs were represented by Bruce Meyerson, 
Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest. P. 0. 
Box 2783, Phoenix, Arizona 85002. July 3.1979 Order 
is reproduced in App. 2 Copies of pleadings are in 
NSCLC files. 
10 See § 4.2.2.1 supra (discussion of "under color law"). 
11 Teitelbaum v. Sorenson. Civ. A. No. 79-199 PHX WEC 
(D. Ariz., filed Mar. 16,1979), Findings of Fact. Conclu-
sions of Law and Preliminary Injunction 1 5 (July 3, 
1979) (Appendix 2). 
Citing the state action doctrines of company town12 and 
nexus theory,13 the court held that state action was present 
in the nominally private facility. 
While the court specifically found that plaintiffs' visit to 
the facility was not at the request of any resident, it held 
that plaintiffs nevertheless enjoyed a constitutionally pro-
tected right of access to the facility, that plaintiffs* com-
munication with Waitwell residents is constitutionally pro-
tected, and that the facility may only place "reasonable 
time, place and manner restrictions" on advocates' visits.14 
On August 6,1979 in a judgment, the court permanently 
enjoined the facility from "directly or indirectly, interfering, 
obstructing or hampering in any manner visits, meetings, 
discussions or other communication" between Waitwell 
residents and volunteers with the nursing home resident 
outreach program.18 
In another case, a legal services program, one of its 
paralegals, and the husband of a nursing home resident 
sued a facility for denying them access.1* The suit alleged 
violation of the first and fourteenth amendments and the 
federal nursing home Residents' Bill of Rights.17 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that while visiting a client, 
the paralegal was approached by another resident regar-
ding a problem at the nursing home. A member of the facili-
ty staff interrupted the conversation, telling the paralegal 
that he could not speak with the resident because she was 
on "'behavior modification"* for being "'a chronic corn-
plainer which results in disruption to the staff and other 
residents."*" The paralegal was unable to speak with the 
resident. On subsequent days, during posted visiting hours, 
the building was locked and the paralegal could not enter 
at all. Another plaintiff complained about the reduction in 
12 See § 4.2.1.2.3 supra. The court ruled that Waitwell 
"provides all necessary services to residents and 
they are physically and psychologically isolated from 
other community activities." Conclusions of Law at 1 
4. Citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and 
two migrant labor cases, Mid-Hudson Legal Services, 
Inc. v. G & U Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and 
Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 
1971), the court held that Waitwell is the "functional 
equivalent" of a town. Id. 
13 See § 4.2.1.2.2 supra. The court found that there was 
"sufficient interdependence between public and 
private conduct" to make Waitwell's actions under 
color of law. Conclusions of Law at § 4. Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Per-
suasive indicia of this interdependence are the facts 
that Waitwell receives a majority (80%) of its income 
from the county for the care of indigent persons, that 
Waitwell is "extensively regulated", and that "the du-
ty to provide care for indigent persons is a public 
function under Arizona law." Conclusions of Law at 
14. 
14 Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, Civ. A. No. 79-199 PHX WEC 
(D. Ariz., filed Mar. 16, 1979), Preliminary Injunction 
Order 1 2. 
15 Id., Judgment (Aug. 6,1979). Plaintiffs are entitled to 
attorneys' fees. Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 
1248 (9th Cir. 1981). 
16 Legal Services Corp. of Iowa v. Bladister, Inc., Civ. A. 
No. 80-263-C, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 770 (Nov. 1980) 
(Clearinghouse No. 29,916) (S.D. Iowa, filed June 24, 
1980). 
17 42 C.F.R. § 442.311 (1980). 
18 Legal Services Corp. of Iowa v. Bladister, Inc., Civ. A. 
No. 80-263-C, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 770 (Nov. 1980) 
(Clearinghouse No. 29,916) (S.D. Iowa, filed June 24, 
1980), Amended and Substituted Complaint 1 39 (Nov. 
18,1980) (quoting the staff member). 
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visiting hours from 12 hours (8 a.m. to 8 p.m.) to 7 hours (12 
noon to 7 p.m.), which limited the time he could spend with 
his wife, who was a resident. 
On November 18,1980, the district court granted defen-
dant's motion to dismiss, finding that there was no state 
action under the theory of joint venturer,™ nexus," affir-
mative approval," delegation of statutory public function," 
or delegation of traditional state function."3Plaintiffs then 
filed a motion to amend the judgment and to amend the 
complaint, which the court granted on January 22,1981 ,M 
The court found two sets of factual allegations in the 
amended complaint sufficient to indicate state action in 
the pleadings state of the civil rights litigation. 
First, plaintiffs alleged that under the state's civil penalty 
system, violations of regulations relating to freedom of 
association between residents and visitors constituted 
class HI violations, but that the state imposed no fine for 
class HI violations.29 
The court said that this state law might serve to make the 
state a joint venturer with the facility. The court described 
plaintiffs' affirmative allegation 
that the state has lent its approval to the challenged 
restriction of visiting hours through its failure to imple-
ment an enforcement mechanism designed to deter 
violations of statutory and regulatory provisions which 
mandate the protection of rights of access of nursing 
home residents. In this manner, plaintiffs have pointed 
to specific state laws which could be deemed to have 
sanctioned the offending conduct for purposes of im-
puting such conduct to the state under the joint ven-
turer doctrine.* 
Second, plaintiffs alleged that the state approved the 
facility's reduced visiting hours through the annual inspec-
tion and certification procedures.27 Plaintiffs further alleg-
ed, on information and belief, that restricted visiting hours 
were more economical for both the facility and the state.20 
The court analyzed these allegations as the "encourage-
19 Id., Memorandum Opinion (granting defendants* Mo-
tion to Dismiss) 11 3-4 (Nov. 18, .1980). See § 4.2.1.2.2 
supra. 
20 Id., Memorandum Opinion 11 4-5. See § A2A22. 
supra. 
21 ld.f Memorandum Opinion 1 5. 
22 Id., Memorandum Opinion 11 57. The court distin-
guished Teitelbaum v. Sorenson because it found 
that Iowa, unlike Arizona, does not by statute 
designate the provision of medical services to the 
elderly as a state function. See § 4.2.1.4 supra. 
23 Legal Services Corp. of Iowa v. Bladister, Inc., Civ. A 
No. 80-263-C, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 770 (Nov. 1980) 
(Clearinghouse No. 29,916) (S.D. Iowa, filed June 24, 
1980), Memorandum Opinion, 11 78 (Nov. 18, 1980). 
The court explicitly rejected the Teitelbaum holding 
that a private nursing home is the functional 
equivalent of a company town. See § 4.2.1.2.3 supra. 
24 Legal Services Corp. of Iowa v. Bladister, inc., Civ. A. 
No. 80-263-C, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 770 (Nov. 1980) 
(Clearinghouse No. 29,916) (S.O. Iowa, filed June 24, 
1980), Memorandum Opinion (Jan. 22,1981). 
25 Id-, Memorandum Opinion 1-2. /d., Amended and 
Substituted Complaint 11 31-33. 
26 Id., Memorandum Opinion 1-2 (Jan. 22, 1981), citing 
Howe v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 667, 
670 (S.D. Iowa 1974), which cited Burton v. Wilm-
ington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961). 
27 Id., Amended and Substituted Complaint 1 51. 
28 Id* Amended and Substituted Complaint 1 52c 
ment theory" of state action: THhe state's acquiescence in 
defendants' imposition of limitations upon visiting hours 
through annual inspection and certification procedures 
conducted by state agencies encouraged or fostered an at-
mosphere wherein the private actors were relatively free to 
promulgate restrictive policies and practices which func-
tioned to deprive residents of their First Amendment 
rights.'™ 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently 
affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim of a suit 
by the Cape Cod Nursing Home Council and Legal Services 
for Cape Cod and Islands, Inc., seeking access to a nursing 
home." The court expressly found the company town 
theory of state action did not apply1' and suggested that 
recognizing constitutionally guaranteed rights of access to 
"outsiders . . . could threaten patient care and pose 
significant risks to the elderly residents,"** citing a case 
discussing union solicitation in hospitals.33 
5.2.3 LITIGATION BY STATE ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL 
The Massachusetts Attorney General successfully sued 
a nursing home that had suspended ail visiting hours "until 
further notice*9 because of the facility's desire to prevent 
the "flu on the outside" from "coming into our home."34 The 
Attorney General filed suit after receiving a call from a 
paralegal with Cambridge and Somerville Legal Services 
who had attempted to visit two clients at the facility and 
was threatened with arrest because of the facility's ban on 
all visitors. 
The state's case was based on two provisions of the At-
torney Generat's Rules and Regulations Relating to Nurs-
ing Homes,1* promulgated by the Attorney General under 
the state consumer protection law.M 
Section 4.1 of these regulations makes it an unfair or 
deceptive trade practice for a nursing home 
to fail or refuse to permit a resident to associate or 
communicate privately, either inside or outside the 
nursing home, with persons of his/her choice at 
reasonable hours or to permit a resident to receive or 
refuse visitors, unless medically contraindicated as 
documented by his/her physician in his/her medical 
record.1* 
29 Id., Memorandum Opinion 2 (Jan. 22, 1981), citing 
Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970), and Reitman v. 
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Id., Amended and 
Substituted Complaint 11 51-54. 
30 Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose 
Rest Home, No. 81-1379 (2d Cir., Dec. 30,1981) (2d Cir. 
1981). 
31 Id., Slip Op. at 3. See § 4.2.1.Z3 supra, 
32 Id. at 6-7. 
33 Eastern Maine Medical Center v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1 
(1st Cir. 1981). 
34 Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. QT Services, 
Inc., No. 78-564 (Mass. Sup. CL, Middlesex County, fil-
ed Jan. 31, 1978) (order issued Feb. 22, 1978). Letter 
from Administrator to All Patients and Their Families 
(Jan. 11,1978), Exhibit A to Complaint. 
35 20 CODE OF MASS. REGS. pt. 5 at 55 (1976). 
36 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, 1 2(c). 
37 Attorney General's Rules and Regulations Relating to 
Nursing Homes, 20 CODE OF MASS. REGS. pt. 5 at 55, § 
4.1 (1976). 
;tion 4.10 states that is an unfair or deceptive trade prac-
3 for a nursing home "to fail or refuse to provide access 
the nursing home to individuals or representatives of 
mmunity groups or of other groups who seek to provide 
ial services to residents without charge to the resident at 
isonable hours."* 
In an interlocutory order,.the court lifted the ban on 
iitors and reinstated the previous visiting hours.3* The 
eliminary injunction expanded visiting hours for family 
id friends.4* 
5.2.4 FEDERAL LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS 
Access is a significant issue at the federal level in both 
le nursing home ombudsman program and the Conditions 
f Participation for Medicare and Medicaid facilities. 
5.2.4.1 Nursing Home Ombudsman Program 
The Comprehensive Older Americans Act Amendments 
>f 197841 considerably strengthened the nursing home on> 
>udsman program by requiring every state to have such a 
>rogram, by giving the program explicit statutory authority 
the program had been operated as a model project by the 
Commissioner on Aging since 1975), and by specifically 
jefining ombudsman functions and responsibilities.42 
Under the 1978 Amendments, the states must "establish 
procedures for appropriate access" by the ombudsman to 
long-term care facilities and to residents' records.44 This 
statutory directive provides the impetus for many states to 
enact laws and regulations addressing the access issue. 
Advocates need to make sure that state laws establishing 
ombudsman programs do not inappropriately or in-
advertently block access of advocates and community 
groups to nursing homes. 
5.2.4.2 Conditions of Participation for Long* 
Term Care Faciiities Participating in 
Medicare and/or Medicaid 
Federal regulations governing access appear in the 
residents' rights section of the Condition of Participation 
for skilled nursing facilities44 and in the standards for in-
termediate care facilities.4* They guarantee residents' 
rights to associate and communicate privately with in-
dividuals, to send and receive mail unopened, and to par-
ticipate in social, religious, and community group ac-
38 Id. § 4.10. 
39 Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. QT Services, 
Inc., No. 78-564 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Middlesex Co., filed 
Jan. 31,1978), Interlocutory Order 1-2 (Feb. 22,1978). 
The previous visiting hours were 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. and 6 
p.m. to 9 p.m. Id. at 1. 
40 Id., Preliminary Injunction. 
41 Pub. L No. 95-478. 92 Stat. 1535 (1978). 
42 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3057g (Supp. Ill 1979). Final regula-
tions implementing the 1978 amendments appear at 
45 Fed. Reg. 21,151 (Mar. 31,1980). A program instruc-
tion on the ombudsman program was issued on Jan. 
19, 1981. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 3027(aK12) (Supp. Ill 1979). 
44 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1121(kX11), (12) (1980). 
45 Id. §44Z311(i). 
tivities. Since these regulations govern only the rights of 
residents, they are of limited value in dealing with the most 
common access problems, which involve the rights of 
nonresidents to enter nursing homes. Proposed new regula-
tions in 1980 would have expanded current access re-
quirements by requiring facilities to designate a minimum 
of 10 visiting hours per day, by granting ombudsmen and 
two persons of the residents' choice unlimited access, and 
by ensuring that all visitors be allowed access to residents 
during posted visiting hours.44 These regulations were 
withdrawn in 1981 by the new administration.4' 
5.2.5 STATE LAWS 
A ideal state access law would include provisions: 
• Explicitly establishing a right of access for legal ser-
vices programs, community groups, and other ad-
vocates (group or individual) that want to visit, talk 
with, and make personal, social, or legal services 
available to residents without charge; 
• Authorizing such advocates to initiate communica-
tions or visits; 
• Establishing explicit enforcement merchanisms. 
The District of Columbia's access provision is con-
sidered by many advocates to be model legislation. Section 
3 of the Health Care Faciiities Regulation states: 
(a) The health care facility shall permit members of 
community organizations and representatives of 
community legal services programs, whose pur-
poses include rendering assistance without 
charge to nursing home patients, to have full and 
free access to the health care facility in order to: 
(1) Visit, talk with, and make personal, social and 
legal services available to all patients. 
(2) Inform patients of their rights and entitlements, 
and their corresponding obligations, under 
Federal and District laws by means of distribu-
tion of educational materials and discussion in 
groups and with individuals. 
(3) Assist patients in asserting their legal tights 
regarding claims for public assistance, medical 
assistance, and social security benefits, as well 
as in all other matters in which patients are ag-
grieved. Assistance may be provided individual-
ly, as well as on a group basis, and may include 
organizational activity, as well as counseling 
and litigation. 
(4) Inspect all areas of the health care facility ex-
cept the living areas of a patient who protests 
such inspection. Such authority shall not in-
clude the right to examine the business records 
of the facility without the consent of the Ad-
ministrator, nor the clinical record of a patient 
without his consent. 
(5) Engage in all other methods of assisting, advis-
ing, and representing patients so as to extend 
to them the full enjoyment of their rights.4* 
46 45 Fed. Reg. 47,368 (July 14, 1980). 
47 46 Fed. Reg. 7,408 (Jan. 23.1981). 
48 No. 74-15, tit. Ill, § 3 (June 14, 1974). 
51 
The D C regulation includes the following enforcement pro-
visions. 
(a) Any person or representative thereof, who is 
damages due to violation of this regulation shall: 
1 have a civil cause of action against any person 
violating this regulation, and 
Z be entitled to recover from any such person: 
(i) actual damages 
(ii) punitive damages 
(ui)a reasonable attorney's fee and litigation 
costs reasonably incurred " 
A number of states have enacted nursing home access 
legislation or regulations *• A new legislative approach to 
the access issue that is potentially damaging to the rights 
of residents' advocates requires community advocacy 
groups to register with a state agency or to receive formal 
state approval in some other way before they may visit nur-
sing home residents. Such laws have been enacted in 
Michigan*1 and Ohio42 Three problems may result from 
registration laws: * 
• Groups that have challenged the state may not gain 
approval; 
• Registration laws may not provide for registration of 
independent advocates who are not formally af-
filiated with advocacy groups; and 
• Such laws may constitute a pnor restraint on the 
speech of potential visitors, in violation of the first 
amendmentM 
49 Id., tit III, § 1(d) 
50 Fix STAT ANN § 400 022(1Xb) (West Supp 1981); Ma 
HEALTH CODE ANN art 43, § 565(C)(a)(11) (1980), MICH 
COMP LAWS ANN § 333 21763, 21764 (1980), N J STAT 
ANN §§ 30 13-3, «4 (1981), OHIO REV CODE ANN § 3721 14 
(Page 1980), OKLA. STAT ANN tit 63, § 1-1919 (West 
Supp 1981), Wis. STAT ANN § 50 09 (West Supp. 
1981-82), Mass. Nursing Home Regs of Att'y Gen , 20 
Code of Mass Regs, pt 53 at 55 § 4 1, 10 (1976), Pa, 
Long-Term Care Regs § 201 35(cHe) 
51 MICH COMP LAWS ANN §§ 333 21763 21764 (1980). 
52 OHIO REV CODE ANN § 3721 14 (Page 1980). 
53 See § 5.22 supra. 
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ADMISSION: DISCF 
MEDICAID 
AND OTHER 
THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION 
ecuring nursing home care and services for poor people 
5 want and need such care Is commonly a problem. 
lough nursing home placement is not the first or most 
•irable option for most older people, it may at times be 
;essary and appropriate. Discrimination against poor 
>ple, including Medicaid recipients, is all-too-frequent. It 
:urs in large part because facilities are able to charge 
i/ate-pay residents rates that are higher than those paid 
government programs, chiefly Medicaid, for identical 
•vices. Avoidance of delay in receiving government pay-
>nt also motivates providers to prefer a private-pay 
enteie. While the problem of discrimination often arises 
the context of involuntary transfer of residents who have 
hausted their personal financial resources and converted 
Medicaid, discrimination at the time of original admis-
>n is an equally serious concern. 
Participation by nursing homes in Medicaid creates few 
(ligations under federal law. Generally, the fact of par-
;ipatlon means only that the facilities will be reimbursed, 
i a per capita basis, for the care and services they provide 
however many Medicaid recipients they choose to serve. 
edicaid participation, in the absence of explicit state 
rection, imposes no obligations to provide care for 
aecific recipients. Facilities use Medicaid for their own 
urposes' and make unilateral (and usually unchallenged) 
ecisions whether to admit or refuse Medicaid recipients 
eeking admission. 
Recently, a number of facilities participating in Medicaid 
cross the country have placed clauses in their admissions 
ontracts requiring that residents agree to pay for care out 
»f private funds (be "private-pay" residents) for a specified 
>enod of time (ranging from several months to several 
ears) before their conversion to Medicaid will be Mac-
:epted" by the facility. Maryland sanctions this practice by 
rtate law.2 
Another problem is that many poor people do not qualify 
or Medicaid, even though they lack sufficient financial 
esources to pay for nursing home (or other medical) care. 
The statutory linkage of Medicaid eligibility with 
categorical assistance programs3 results in the exclusion 
1 See Stitt v. Manor Care, Inc., No. C78-630, [1979-1] 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 1 29,409, (N.D. Ohio 
Oct. 24, 1978) 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245 (Aug. 1978) 
(Clearinghouse No. 24,702) (Court observed that 
facilities participate in Medicaid when they open in 
order to develop a good cash flow, then withdraw 
from the program when they are able to fill their beds 
with residents from the more profitable private-pay 
market). 
Other facilities restrict use of Medicaid to their 
own private-pay residents who spend their money 
and need to convert to Medicaid. 
2 Mo. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. 45, § 565QaK18Xv) (1981 
Cum. Supp.). 
3 See § 2.1.2^ supra. 
IMINATION AGAINST 
RECIPIENTS 
POOR PEOPLE 
of many poor people from Medicaid coverage. The problem 
is especially severe in states without programs for the 
medically needy:1 In these states, many poor people are in-
eligible for aid under the Medicaid program. Securing nurs-
ing home care for non-Medicaid eligible poor people is a se-
cond aspect of the access to care and services issue. 
Two levels of response to the problem of discriminatory 
admissions are necessary. First, voluntary participation by 
a facility in the Medicaid program must be held to impose 
an obligation to provide care on a nondiscriminatory basis.9 
Second, and more broadly, ail facilities must be required to 
provide care for poor people because of the state's obliga-
tion to provide for the health and welfare of its citizens and 
because of the facilities' state-sanctioned monopoly.* 
Few litigation strategies have been developed to address 
discriminatory admissions problems.7 More success, to 
date, has been reported in state legislative and ad-
ministrative advocacy.* To the extent that discrimination 
against Medicaid recipients masks racial discrimination or 
discrimination against handicapped persons, additional 
strategies, both administrative and litigative, may be used.9 
Specific strategies for dealing with contractually-forced 
periods of private payment before conversion to Medicaid 
are also available.10 
6.2 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
ADVOCACY 
Discrimination against poor people, including Medicaid 
recipients, might in fact be racial discrimination or 
discrimination against handicapped people. These kinds of 
discrimination are prohibited by federal law — Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,12 respectively - and may be the 
subject of administrative complaints to the Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR) of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS). The Hill-Burtonu obligations of public and non-
profit facilities may also be the subject of federal ad-
ministrative advocacy. 
6.2.1 TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
OF 1964 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 prohibits discrim-
ination on grounds of race, color, or national origin by pro-
4 See §2.1.2.2 supra, 
5 See § 6.4.1 intra. 
6 See § 6.4.2 intra. 
7 See § 6.3 infra, 
8 See § 6.4 infra. 
9 See §§ 6.2.1, 6^2, 6.3.2 infra. 
10 See § 6.5 infra. 
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), Pub. L No. 88-352, § 601, 78 
Stat 252 (1964). 
12 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), Pub. L No. 93-112, § 504, 87 
Stat. 394 (1973); 45 C.F.R. Part 84 (1980). 
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 2910-1 (1976). 
14 42 U.S.C § 2000d (1976), Pub. L No. 88-352, § 601 78 
Stat. 252 (1964). 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
IN AKD FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
RABBI 
LARRY 
SAMUEL TEITELBAUM, 
and LOUISE DIEHL, 
vs 
THEODORE 
WAITWELL 
Plaintiffs, 
SORENSON, D/3/A 
NURSING HOME 
Defendant. 
and ) 
CIV. NOA 79-199 PHX WEC 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
The plaintiffs1 motion for preliminary-injunction came 
on regularly for hearing at 2 o'clock p.m. on Wednesday, April 11, 
1979, with all parties represented by counsel. The Court pro-
ceeded to take evidence and testimony and has now considered the 
matter, the memoranda and arguments of the parties and now makes 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to 
Rule 65(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiffs in this action arc volunteers 
connected with a nursing home patient outjreach project (outreach 
project) sponsored by the Arizona Center for Law in the Public 
Interest. The purpose of the program is to-enable residents of 
nursing facilities to (1) learn about their rights and benefits, 
and (2) receive visitation from persons familiar with the 
31
 ji problems of the elderly and knowledgeable about the rights of 
A \I I f11 ?^??11^ home patients. (Affidavit of Rit^ i Schmidt) 
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2. Defendant Theodore Sorcnson, operates as a sole 
proprietorship,Waitwell Nursing Home, 5910 West Northern 
Avenue, Glcndale, Arizona 85302. Waitwell is a privately-
owned skilled nursing facility licensed by the Arizona Depart-
ment of Health Services to provide nursing services to 135 
patients. Joseph Grabowski is the administrator. 
3. On February 8, 1979, the plaintiffs along with 
Rita Schmidt, who is the director of the outreach project, 
. visited Waitwell Nursing Home for the purpose of advising the 
residents about the availability of an Arizona state renter's 
tax credit or refund. Although the volunteers along with Ms. 
Rita Schmidt were admitted into the facility, they were not 
permitted to discuss the income tax information with the 
patients. When Ms. Schmidt contacted Mr. Grabowski to arrange 
a follow-up visit to see if the patients had filled out the 
forms, Mr. Grabowski refused to allow the volunteers to return 
for that purpose. (Testimony of Joseph Grabowski) 
4. Waitwell Nursing Home provides skilled nursing 
services to its patients. The patients eat their meals, 
sleep, and carry out their daily activities, including recreatior 
at the facility. Housekeeping services are also provided.* 
Generally speaking, all of their needs are met through services 
provided to them at the facility. The overwhelming percentage 
of the patients are not able to easily leave the facility? 
many are bedridden. (Testimony of Joseph Grabowski, Gary 
Anderson) 
5. The patients at Waitwell Nursing Home are 
comparable to patients at skilled nursing facilities throughout 
Arizona. They are elderly and/or infirm and their lives are 
characterized by dependency upon the nursing home staff and 
administration. The institutional environment in which tihoy 
iNn/Appendix 2 
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and voicing concerns and grievances. Many of the patients are 
physically unable to care for themselves and many are mentally 
unable to effectively communicate. (Testimony of Gordon Aldridge, 
Gary Anderson) 
6„ Patient contact should not be limited to staff 
of the facility. Visitation by persons from outside the facility 
is essential because patients in an institutional environment 
8 Jj can lose touch with the world outside of the institution. 
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(Testimony of Gordon Aldridge) 
7o Advocacyiefforts such as are provided by t^ ie 
I 
outreach project, cannot be effectively administered by t^ ie 
nursing home staff. Patients are frequently intimidated by 
staff and it is unrealistic to expect the staff of a facility to 
encourage the patients to voice grievances and complaints!. 
(Testimony of Gordon Aldridge) 
8. Although patients at the facility may at times 
become confused or may not be entirely functional, they may still 
benefit greatly from visitation. (Testimony of Mary Ann tinberg) 
These patients have the greatest need for outside advocates such 
i 
as the volunteers from the outreach project. (Testimony of 
Gordon Aldridge) 
9. Waitwell Nursing Home permits a variety of 
volunteer groups access to the facility, Activities include 
arts and crafts, singing and religious services. Volunteers are 
i 
encouraged to bring clothing and other items to patients. The 
emphasis of the Waitwell volunteer program is different f£om 
the emphasis of the outreach project. (Testimony of Kare^ i 
Gowins) 
10. Approximately 80- of the patients at Waitwell 
Nursing Home are county patients. These patients are indigent 
and their care is paid for by Maricopa County. Approximately 
80% of the facility's revenue is derived from Maricopa County. 
3 NH/Appendix 2 
(Testimony of Joseph Grabowski) 
11* Maricopa County has a Patient Care Team, composed 
of a physician, a registered nurse and a social worker, which 
visits nursing facilities caring for "county" patients. The team 
visits each patient in accordance with the medical care plan, in 
accordance with state regulations or depending upon the need of 
the patient. The team monitors and reviews the total medical care 
of indigent persons in accordance with state regulations and 
accepted standards of care. Maricopa County expects that each 
facility serving county patients will adhere to applicable state 
regulations and acceptable standards of care with respect to the 
services which the facility provides to the patient. (Affidavit 
of Phyllis Biedess) 
12. The plaintiffs and other persons connected with 
the outreach project desire to return to Waitwell to inform 
patients of their rights, assist patients in resolving complaints 
atid aiding patients with other matters of concern to them. 
(Affidavit of, Rita Schmidt) 
13. .There is nothing in the record to show that the 
privacy of the patients will be interfered with in any manner 
by the plaintiffs' activities. Based upon the evidence, it* 
appears that the outreach project operates in a responsible 
manner. Even the defendant had no knowledge of any complaints 
concerning the outreach project. (Testimony of Theodore 
Sorenson," Gary Anderson) 
14. The visitation o£ the plaintiffs and Rita Schmidt 
on February 8, 1979 was not at the request of any patient of 
The Waitwell Nursing Home, and was made over the objection of 
the defendant. 
15. The patients at The Waitwell Nursing Home are 
patients requiring skilled nursing care, which is the highest 
level of care which may be provided by nursing homes under Arizond 
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law, and each patient is under the care of a physician 
16, The Waitwcll Nursing Home is subject tn «.. < 
wu
 stringent | regulation by the Arizona Department of Health Service 
! 
2 
3 
4 jj CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
5 1.. This action has been properly filed undQr 
6 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The Court h 
1 jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 \ \ A ^ 
1JA3
 And 28 
8 Jj U.S.C. S 2201, the Declaratory Judgment Act* 
2. The actions of the defendant restricting 9 " 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
nt 
interfering with the plaintiffs' communication to tho 
here was.under color of law within the meaning of 42 M ~ _ 
S 1983. 
3. Waitwell Nursing Home is the "functions 
nal
 «quivale.' 
of a town. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 90 LcEd. 265 no 
since the facility provides all necessary services to th 
dents and they are physically and psychologically co^fi 
isolated-from other community activities. See Mid-Hi,^ 
' -^S£Qft Legal 
Services, Inc. v. G. & U., Inc. 437 F.Supp. 60 (S«De^ v 
Folgueras v^ Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. IQTI* 
"
 X 9 7 l ) . Although 
there are several "migrant labor camp* cases in which 
courts have found that state action did not exist. *«*.». 
' *n those cases 
there was an absence of proof that the migrant worv**.. 
Qrs
 ^ r e , for 
all practical purposes, physically or psychologically 
* confined 
to the perimeters of the private property. Illinoi- u< 
Council v. Camobell Soup, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. IQTJM 
x
*'
8)? Agociacion 
de Trabajadores v. Green Giant Company, 518 F .2d, Itn /* 
' — '
 4J0
 (3rd Cir. 
1975) • The private property of Waitwell Nursing \\QmQ * 
all the components of a town thus it has become «U£F< i 
^iCiently 
state-like to fulfill the state-action requirement* * 
**
 cnco
 *or invoking 
First Amendment rights. 
4. Additionally, since Waitwell Nursing JIQ 
receives a majority of its income from Maricopa Can** 
—
 u
"tv tor 
5 
providing care to indigent patients, (2) is extensively regulated, 
and (3) where the duty to provide care for indigent persons 
is a public .function nndor Arixo»,i law, tbesn is sufficient 
interdependence between public and private conduct giving rise to 
action under color
 0f iaw. Mathis v. Opportunities Industriali-
zation Center, 545
 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1976); Ginn v. Mathews, 533 
F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1976). See Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.?, 715, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). 
5. The Plaintiffs' communication is constitutionally 
protected under th<^  ist and 14th Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and m^y not be restricted and conditioned by the 
defendant, except that the defendant may place reasonable time, 
place and manner restrictions/ Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141. 
87 L.Ed. 1119 (1943). Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 83 L.Ed. 
1423 (1939). 
6. The denial and abridgement of the plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights constitutes irreparable injury. Schnell v. 
City of Chicago, 4Q7
 F#2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Henry .v. Green-
ville Airport Comn^n.f 284 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1960). 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law, and
 t n e court finding (1) that plaintiffs will 
suffer irreparably injury if an injunction is not granted, (2) 
that the likelihood
 Qf any injury to the defendant is remote, 
XW £te plaintiff^ fn22 probably succeed ca tte merits, aad 
(4) the public interest is served by granting injunctive relief, 
IT IS HfeR£By ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied; 
2. The defendant, his employees, agents and all those 
acting, in concert with him, and any successor owner, are hereby 
enjoined during the pendency of this action, from directly or 
Hpn. Walter E. Craig // 
tinited States District/Judge 
1 indirectly, interfering, obstructing or hampering in any manner 
2 visits, meetings, discussions or other communication, between 
3 I the plaintiffs and those persons in active concert or participa-
4 tion with them and patients at Waitwell Nursing Home; except that 
5 the defendant may place reasonable time, place and manner rostric-
6 tions on visitations* 
7 3. The defendant's motion for a stay of this Order 
8 pending appeal is denied. 
9 DONE IN OPEN COURT this o ^ day of dkm</r 1979. 
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